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Abstract: As markets become increasingly more competitive firms systematically move 
away from hierarchical integrated supply chains toward fragmented networks of strategic 
partnerships with external partners. Business practice indicate a growing number of 
businesses relying on the platform organizational structures. For such constructs superior 
product quality and customer appeal maintain necessary but it is the breadth of the 
ecosystem of related product and services that has become a prerequisite for success. It 
implies the focus on third parties, complementors, who develop and deliver diverse content 
to plat-forms as well as enhance platform’s generativity. Although complementary relations 
should be the main reference while considering the network dynamics from different angles, 
the attention in the extant research gravitates toward inter-platform competition with 
platform owners as the central object. Thus, with the objective to contribute to the emerging 
literature on industry platforms, this conceptual article discusses main challenges 
concerned with orchestrating arm’s length relationships with complementors, by departing 
from platform-owner-centered approach and focusing on behavior of interdepended 
contributors. 
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Introduction 
 
Structural transformation induced by a pervasive information and communication 
technology intertwined with global dispersion of supply chains has been labeled as a third 
globalization, a globalization reconfigured by digital platforms and the cloud [Kenney, 
Zysman 2016]. Algorithmically driven reorganization enables efficient conversion of broad 
human efforts and consumer assets into monetized goods. Observable rise of digitally 
defined businesses is gaining considerable scholarly attention across diverse fields of 
technology management, innovation management, strategic management, industrial 
economics [e.g. de Reuver, Sorensen, Basole 2017; Wareham, Fox, Cano Giner 2014; 
McIntyre, Srinivasan 2017]. On-going discussions gravitate toward technologically framed 
business choices that shape the competitive landscape, define the influence of variety of 
autonomous agents on value creation, delivery, and determine the range of control over the 
compensation for work performed by networks of value co-creators [Ja-cobides, Cennamo, 
Gawer 2015; Venkatraman et al. 2014]. It is argued that in the current competitive context 
superior product quality and customer appeal maintain necessary but it is the breadth of the 
ecosystem of related product and services that has become a prerequisite for success 
[McIntyre, Srinivasan 2017]. Hence, complementary relations are being brought up front 
while considering the interplay between value creation and value capture within the interfirm 
network [Schreieck, Wiesche, Krcmar 2017; Cennamo, Santalo 2013]. There is a growing 
body of literature on strategies for exploiting network effects, however rarely addresses the 
dynamic tension between inter- and intra-platform competition. Thus, with the objective to 
contribute to the emerging literature on industry platforms, this conceptual article discusses 
main challenges concerned with orchestrating arm’s length relationships with 
complementors, by departing from platform-owner-centered approach and focusing on 
behavior of interdepended contributors. 
 
 
Strategic management perspective on complementary 
relations 
 
From the strategic management perspective organizations can create value in an “exc-
lusive” manner by combining own internally developed resources and capabilities or 
“collectively” with the use of external resources and capabilities accessed through inter -
organizational relationships [Lavie 2007; Najda-Janoszka 2016]. Extant research and ob-
served business practice indicate however that firms are rarely able, or want, to perform all 
their activities in-house [Lavie 2007; Niemczyk, Stańczyk-Hugiet, Jasiński 2012; Czakon 
2012].   Hence,  firms  engage  in  various   inter-organizational   constellations  driven   by 
 
 
  
 
 
 
expectations of additional opportunities for value creation and capture that derive from the 
access to extended set of resources and capabilities owned/controlled by partners. 
Complementary resources provided by cooperating partners may directly contribute to firm 
performance through enrichment, strategic bundling, and/or absorption by internalization 
[Lavie 2007]. Moreover, participating in collaborative endeavor can generate synergies not 
only at the level of the resource base but also across activity systems [Ford et al. 2011]. 
However, potential additional benefits come with potential additional costs [negotiation, 
adaptation, maintenance, etc.) for parties involved. Evaluation becomes challenging as it 
involves a broader context of other business relationships of a given firm [Hakansson, 
Snehota 2005]. 
 
Other studies turned the attention to the importance of the access to complementary 
assets for successful implementation of innovations by discriminating between generic and 
specialized ones [Teece 2001]. It is argued that while acquiring generic assets usually does 
not cause major problems, gaining access to specialized complementary assets is more 
challenging and time consuming. Specialization of assets implies special purpose, 
irreversible investments that raise the risks for the engaged party. Thus, it is assumed that 
the control over complementary assets gains in importance with a greater degree of asset 
specialization. Further, the problem of in-sourcing innovative activity was addressed with an 
open innovation paradigm, according to which firms make a greater strategic use of external 
knowledge (outside-in approach) and simultaneously decide to externalize certain 
components of their intellectual property [Chesbrough 2003]. By opening up an innovation 
process to complementors [customers, suppliers, universities, competitors], a formerly 
protected know how becomes a means for knowledge exchange, which is expected to 
ultimately lead to additional monetary and strategic benefits [Dahlander, Gann 2010; 
Chesbrough 2003]. However, given that open innovation model does not imply 
externalization of all possessed knowledge assets, the main challenge concerns ability to 
simultaneously protect and share proprietary components of know-how [Dahlander, Gann 
2010]. An appealing approach discussed in the literature implies aligning product 
architecture with intellectual property according to a modular design [Henkel, Baldwin, Shih 
2013]. Extending modularization from physical production process to intellectual property 
allows for managing a right balance between systemic and autonomous innovations 
triggering product development. Although partners may innovate on modules, a focal firm 
maintains proprietary those areas of knowledge that are sensitive and necessary for 
innovating at the product architecture level [Henkel et al. 2013]. Hence, modularity is 
commonly recognized as one of the fundamental drivers of the rise of platform businesses 
[Hidding, Williams, Sviokla 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Platform defined business activity 
 
Based on the logic of a relatively stable core coupled with variable peripherals [Bald-win & 
Woodard 2009], platform can be seen as a vehicle for combining scale and scope 
economics together with product differentiation at the same time. Although platform logic is 
not new in the management field and business practice [Rochet, Tirole 2006; Jacobides et 
al. 2015], the astounding advances in digitalization enhanced potential and accelerated 
omnipresence of platforms in the current environment. Hence, the concept evolved from a 
vehicle for developing product portfolios serving different market needs [platforms bounded 
inside firms], to markets enabling direct transactions across different customer groups [two-
sided, multi-sided platforms], and to industry level structures generating innovation through 
derivative applications, developed by external complementors (industry platforms) (Table 1). 
 
Table. 1. Platform types 
 
Category Definition Distinctive author 
  focus  
    
Internal 
platforms Internal system of production enabling Product family Piezunka [2011] 
 recombination of components within the   
 firm boundaries   
Multi-sided Markets enabling direct transactions transactions Jacobides et al. 
platforms across different customer groups charac-  [2015, p. 18] 
 terized by network effects between these   
 groups.   
Industry 
platforms Building blocks [they can be products, innovations Gawer [2009, p. 45] 
 services or technologies] that act as a   
 
foundation upon which other firms 
develop complementary innovations   
    
 
Source: author’s own work. 
 
Observed fast diffusion of platforms across industries [e.g. telecommunication finance, 
transport, healthcare, tourism) refers to those last types allowing for capitalizing on network 
effects [Gawer 2014; Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne 2011]. Given that multisided 
platforms and industry platforms bring together many user groups [end-customers, 
suppliers, third-parties – complementors) the value of those platforms increases with the 
number of users in the same user group (direct network externalities) as well as with the 
size of a different user group (indirect network externalities) [Katz, Shapiro 1994]. Such 
network dynamics leads to a basic premise that platforms expected to be popular end up 
more popular [Katz, Shapiro 1994], and to a generally predicted outcome labeled as 
“winner-take-all”, meaning that platform owners (holding property rights over plat-form) 
capture  most  of  the value being created in the by participating  parties [Cennamo, 
Santalo, 2013]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Orchestrating networks of complementors 
 
Businesses relying on the platform organizational structure have to manage the value 
creation and capture that occurs outside the company, in a broad network [Parker, Van 
Alstyne, Jiang 2017]. Thus, the main focus is on third parties, complementors, who develop 
and deliver diverse content (e.g. apps, plug-ins, extensions etc.), as platform growth is not 
limited by the necessity for developing proprietary assets [Parker et al. 2016]. 
Building on self-reinforcing effects of network dynamics there is a common agreed that 
the main mechanisms driving a platform’s value are the increase in the installed user base 
and the availability of complementary assets [Cennamo, Santalo 2013]. Thus, striving to 
bring multiple sides on board as quickly as possible [Rochet, Tirole 2006], platforms 
encounter a key dilemma labeled as “chicken-and-egg-problem” [Caillard, Jullien 2003] as 
getting interest of one side depends on the number of users at the other side. Platform 
owners, as property right holders, have the right to determine who can participate in the 
platform’s network, determine the rules of the platform [Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne 
2006], but the relationship with complementors is distinct from the one with suppliers – 
instead of a principal-agent dependency there is an arm’s length relation [Tiwana, 
Konsynsky, Bush 2010]. Hence, the important challenge for platform owners concerns an 
effective way for encouraging complementors users in the absence of formal roles and 
hierarchical control structures. Extant research highlight the need to empower 
complementors through orchestration that aims at defining core architecture and transfer 
design capability to complementors [von Hippel, Katz 2002]. Such transfer occurs through 
boundary resources defined as “software tools, regulations that serve as the interface for 
the arm’s length relationship between the platform owner and the application developer” 
[Ghazawneh, Hendfridsson 2013, p. 174]. Hence, boundary resources are often referred to 
as central strategic tools for managing cooperation and competition in platform ecosystems. 
Recognizing  the  importance of boundary resources for understanding platform dynamics, 
some scholars argue that the point of attention should be shifted from the core of the 
platform to boundary resources [Hendfridsson, Bygstad 2013]. Nevertheless, transforming 
organizational resources into platform boundary resources requires time and effort, as well 
as it triggers competing concerns whether to keep a resource proprietary as a source of 
competitive advantage in a given market [Svahn, Mathiassen, Lindgren 2017]. Further, even 
though a platform successfully transformed resources into boundary ones, complementors 
may not necessarily use them in expected mode and scale. Depending on the complexity of 
the developed solution it may take time to utilize boundary resources in an efficient manner. 
According to Kapoor and Agarwal [2017] it is the platform specific experience gathered by 
complementors through the process of learning by doing (trial and error experimentation, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accumulation of new capabilities) that has a direct influence on their ability to sustain 
superior performance. Moreover, experienced contributors may use various strategies for 
exploiting boundary resources beyond the initially designed field, which may negatively 
affect the performance of the platform owner [Karhu, Gustafsson 2015]. Thus, a well 
thought-out cooperation in the process of developing boundary resources appears critical 
as well as a deep understanding the design and usage of boundary resources by both sides 
– plat-form owners and complementors. 
 
An emerging literature on platforms have discussed various strategies enabling rapid 
growth of installed base of participants. Most of those propositions refer to variation in 
pricing [e,g, Hagiu 2005], subsidizing one side of the platform [e.g. Eisenman et. al 2006], 
exclusive contracting [e.g. Armstrong, Wright 2007]. Existing studies provided interesting 
insights, however fragmented, since all those strategies have been investigated separately 
driven by the assumption that platforms introduce one dominant growth strategy at a time 
[Cennamo, Santalo 2013]. Addressing the gap, Cennamo, Santalo [2013] examined 
platforms implementing simultaneously two growth strategies aimed at managing 
complementary goods, one focused on improving content by stimulating competition among 
complementors, and the second focused on outcompeting rivals by securing exclusive 
platform applications. Obtained findings confirmed that combining different strategies for a 
rapid growth of networks generates strategic tradeoffs, which represent hidden constraints 
to “winner-take-all” approach. In result a narrow, intense focus on the network growth may 
instead undermine the very performance of a platform. Hence, there is a need for a more 
nuanced view on the intra-platform competition between complementors – as there is so 
many of them with often similar value propositions – and between the platform and 
complementors over the value created. There is a growing literature addressing the issue of 
inter-platform competition [e.g. Boudreau 2010; Eisenmann et al. 2011; Rochet, Tirole 
2006], while the intra-platform competition remains relatively underexplored [Kapoor, 
Agarwal 2017; Tiwana 2015]. A recent study addressing this gap has examined interaction 
between value capture mechanisms used by platform owners and complementors’ 
incentives to co-create value in the platform network [Schreieck et al. 2017]. Authors 
identified three broad mechanisms used for capturing value: 
 
 
· Absorption – platform owner extends the core with functionalities or whole applications 
formerly offered by complementors (acquisition, imitation, extension), 
 
· Co-selling – platform owner support complementors in selling their products (bundling, 
branding, certification, customer enablement), 
 
· Verticalization – platform owner develops and implements vertical use cases together 
with complementors (customization to specific industries). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings indicated both reinforcing (co-selling) and alleviating (absorption and 
verticalization) effects on value creation. Such insights inform the general debate on the 
degree of platform openness, defined through technological features as well as through the 
perception of current and potential complementors [Boudreau 2010]. Despite an open 
provision of boundary resources (module interfaces) the intra-platform competitive dynamics 
may restrict the perceived freedom for complementors [Schreieck et al. 2017]. The role of 
perception in the decision making by complementors is to a large extent unexplored research 
area. Further, the business practice has confirmed that openness comes with a price. 
Although a very high degree of openness encourage complementors and enhances platform’s 
generativity, it intensifies intra-platform com-petition between contributors and also makes 
difficult to control all activities and outco-mes in the network [Benlian et al. 2015; Casadesus-
Masanell, Halaburda 2014]. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
A review of extant research provides an interesting picture for designing further studies 
on platform defined businesses. Available findings as well as arguments presented in several 
recent studies suggest a privileged position of platform owners in business structures as well 
as in the scientific inquiry. Complementors, although defined as critical to the value creation 
within the platform ecosystem, have received significantly less attention. Scholars tend to 
focus on strategies used by platform firms to attract complementors and to compete against 
other rival platforms. There are scarce studies that provide insights into the performance of 
complementors, used competitive strategies, their interrelations within the platform as well as 
with the other market agents. Lacking understanding of how complementors create and 
capture value may not be without significance for effective orchestration of platform activities. 
Moreover, as platform design businesses become more and more complex and highly 
digitized, they exhibit various innovation dynamics on different levels of their technical 
architecture. Each level may contain different components, hence different networks of 
complementors, although it is also possible that some complementors may bridge across 
those levels. Considering such complexity it becomes even more evident that complementors 
should receive more scholarly attention that embraces not only technical issues but also 
perception that underlies further decision process. Further, shifting from a platform ownership-
centric perspective it could be also promising to focus more on the actual linkage between 
platform and complementors, and conceptualize platform dynamics in terms of distributed 
actors that collectively tune boundary resources. Such a shift can enrich the picture by 
providing opportunity to observe and analyze strategizing on both sides – platform owners and 
complementors.                                                                  
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